Partnership, ownership and control: the impact of corporate governance on employment relations by Deakin, S. et al.
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 
research output of Birkbeck College 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
 
 
Deakin, Simon; Hobbs, Richard; Konzelmann, Suzanne 
and Wilkinson, Frank (2002). Partnership, ownership and 
control: the impact of corporate governance on 
employment relations. Employee Relations 24 (3) 335 – 
352.  
 
 
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in Employee 
Relations (ISSN 0142-5455 ).This version has been peer-reviewed but does 
not include the final publisher proof corrections, published layout or 
pagination.  
 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law. 
 
 
 
Citation for this version: 
Deakin, Simon; Hobbs, Richard; Konzelmann, Suzanne and Wilkinson, Frank 
(2002). Partnership, ownership and control: the impact of corporate 
governance on employment relations. London: Birkbeck ePrints.  
Available at: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/archive/00000304
 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
Deakin, Simon; Hobbs, Richard; Konzelmann, Suzanne and Wilkinson, Frank 
(2002). Partnership, ownership and control: the impact of corporate 
governance on employment relations. Employee Relations 24 (3) 335 – 352.  
 
 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk
Published in Employee Relations 24(3):335-352, 2002.
 
 
Partnership, Ownership and Control: The Impact of Corporate Governance on 
Employment Relations 
 
Simon Deakin, Richard Hobbs, Suzanne Konzelmann and Frank Wilkinson*
 
Abstract 
 
Prevailing patterns of dispersed share ownership and rules of corporate governance 
for UK listed companies appear to constrain the ability of managers to make credible, 
long-term commitments to employees of the kind needed to foster effective labour-
management partnerships.  We present case study evidence which suggests that such 
partnerships can nevertheless emerge where product market conditions and the 
regulatory environment favour a stakeholder orientation.  Proactive and mature 
partnerships may also be sustained where the board takes a strategic approach to 
mediating between the claims of different stakeholder groups, institutional investors 
are prepared to take a long-term view of their holdings, and strong and independent 
trade unions are in a position to facilitate organisational change. 
 
Key words: labour-management partnerships, corporate governance, takeovers, 
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Introduction 
 
Most large British private-sector organisations are listed companies that are subject to 
intense pressures to prioritise shareholder value. The question arises of whether this 
constrains the ability of managers to pursue genuine partnership arrangements with 
long-term stakeholders, including employees.  We present empirical evidence 
addressing this question in the form of qualitative case studies of labour-management 
partnerships in companies operating within different corporate governance structures.  
Building the trust required for partnership is indeed problematic in some companies 
with the ‘dispersed shareholder ownership’ which is typical of the UK. Companies 
with continental-European forms of ‘concentrated ownership’ are often better able to 
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make credible commitments to their employees.  However, ownership is not decisive 
on its own.  Regulatory factors, in particular relating to product markets, are also 
important, as is the strategic role of the boards of particular companies in shaping 
their approach to corporate governance.  We review cases of companies which have 
developed enduring labour-management partnerships while continuing to be active in 
the market for corporate control and maintaining a wide share ownership base.  We 
suggest that where the corporate governance system can be seen to support 
partnership in this way, it operates in conjunction with regulation underpinning 
quality standards, relative stability in product markets, and, above all, a willingness on 
the part of senior management to mediate between the claims of different stakeholder 
groups, rather than seeing themselves simply as agents of the shareholders.   
 
The significance of corporate governance for labour-management partnerships 
 
The benefits of labour-management partnerships are, in principle, well understood.  
Partnership allows for the full exploitation of technical complementarities in 
production, it facilitates the sharing of knowledge, and, above all, it fuels the 
organizational learning processes by which new information and knowledge are 
created and diffused, and by which new products, processes and organizational forms 
are developed (Wilkinson, 2000).  The hallmark of partnership is that the parties give 
open-ended commitments to cooperate, in the expectation that these benefits will 
follow.  This necessarily entails an extended time horizon.  It also involves an 
acknowledgement on both sides of their mutual exposure to risk.  In this sense, to 
qualify as an ‘influential stakeholder group’ within an enterprise, employees ‘must 
bear significant residual risks, contribute valued resources, and have sufficient power 
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to affect organizational outcomes’ (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000: 370).  In other 
words, employees must not only put valued resources at risk, in the sense of incurring 
costs if the enterprise fails or their relationship with it terminates; management must 
in return accept that employees should be able to exercise a degree of power in the 
context of corporate decision making.  At the very least, this implies that they should 
be meaningfully informed and consulted when decisions over the shape and structure 
of the enterprise are made.  
 
The corporate governance literature increasingly recognizes that fairness of treatment, 
job satisfaction, high quality of work environment and, particularly, income and job 
security are important factors in generating investments in firm-specific capital by 
employees (Blair, 1995; Kelly and Parkinson, 1998; Slinger and Deakin, 2000).  
Equally, a growing body of work in the theory and practice of human resource 
management points to a link between effective HRM and improved corporate 
performance (see Guest, 2001, for an overview).  However, it is also clear that the 
possibility of these gains will not necessarily induce management to adopt a pro-
stakeholder stance.  A low-commitment, low-cost alternative may be to pursue 
increased market share through a strategy of cost reduction, involving minimal 
commitments of job security and a marginal role for employee voice.  The product 
market has been identified as a factor shaping this aspect of corporate strategy; cost-
reduction approaches are thought to be more likely in sectors where product or 
services are relatively undifferentiated and managers perceive little scope for 
competing on quality (Schuler and Jackson, 1987). 
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While this focus on the product market has been useful, the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on corporate strategy in general and on human resource 
management in  particular has until recently been neglected.  One of the very few 
studies to make the link explicit is Kochan and Rubinstein’s study of Saturn, the US 
vehicle manufacturer which was set up as an experiment in partnership between 
General Motors and the United Auto Workers union (Kochan and Rubinstein, 2000; 
Rubinstein and Kochan, 2001).  One of the messages of the Saturn experiment is that 
there is a still unresolved tension between the priority granted to shareholder interests 
by the US corporate governance system, and efforts to build labour-management 
partnerships which will endure over time. 
 
One reason for this is that the particular form taken by shareholder ownership in large 
American and British corporations may shorten the time horizon over which 
managerial strategies are conceived and implemented. Publicly-listed companies in 
both systems are characterized by dispersed-shareholder ownership. The principal 
shareholders are institutions – insurance companies and pension funds – who invest 
on behalf of their policy-holders and beneficiaries.  They place the day-to-day control 
and management of their shareholdings in fund managers and other specialist 
investors who act as their agents.  Typically, the share structure of a listed company 
will consist of several blocks, each consisting of up to 5-10 per cent of the total share 
capital, that are controlled by fund managers on behalf of a number of clients.  By 
contrast, the dominant block-holding or concentrated ownership model, in which one 
shareholder (normally another company, a family holding, or a bank) holds a majority 
or near-majority stake, while common in continental Europe, is rare for UK listed 
companies.  
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 Differences in ownership structure have direct implications for corporate governance.  
Concentration allows dominant shareholders to intervene directly if management 
underperforms or neglects shareholder value.  Dispersion makes internal control of 
this kind problematic, thanks to the substantial collective action costs of mobilizing 
large numbers of individual shareholders.  As a result of this separation of ownership 
and control, management may enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy.  The 
problem is reduced but not eliminated by the growing assertiveness of institutional 
investors in the UK and US (Hawley and Williams, 2000).  One response, which has 
been increasingly characteristic of UK corporate governance since the 1960s, is to 
permit and encourage an active market for corporate control in the form of hostile 
takeover bids (see Deakin and Slinger, 1997).  The threat of a hostile bid is said to 
discipline management to align its interests with those of the shareholders.  However, 
hostile bids also tend to induce asset disposals and job losses in the companies 
targeted, leading some to suggest that any surplus they generate for shareholders is 
achieved at the expense of breach of long-term ‘implicit contracts’ with the other 
stakeholders, in particular employees (Shleifer and Summers, 1988). 
 
Ownership also affects stakeholder relations more generally.  With dispersed share 
ownership, shareholders benefit from the possibility of low-cost exit.  The resulting 
liquidity in capital markets enables them to take advantage of alternative investment 
opportunities, and in principle permits more efficient resource allocation.  The 
disadvantage is that other stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers and customers 
contributing firm-specific inputs, knowing that the shareholders may switch their 
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investments at short notice, may be dissuaded from making long-term investments of 
their own in the firm (Franks and Mayer, 1998: 728).  
 
In this context, the specific issue we wish to address is whether dispersed-shareholder 
ownership constrains the development of a partnership approach in employment 
relations.  Given that the time-dimension of partnership is crucial, the threat of exit by 
shareholders might be expected to undermine the credibility of attempts by 
management to build enduring partnership relations.  By contrast, we might expect 
concentrated ownership to enable managers and shareholders more easily to make a 
credible commitment not to renege on ‘implicit contracts’ made with the other 
stakeholders.   
 
The case studies 
 
We aim to throw light on these questions by reference to qualitative case study 
evidence drawn from a sample of enterprises operating in the UK under different 
forms of corporate ownership.  The case study firms are: a large specialised cleaning 
and facilities management company (‘Cleanwell UK’); a large manufacturing 
company (‘Tenswell UK’); a large telecommunications company (‘Hearwell’); two 
major multi-utilities providing electricity and gas services (‘Seewell UK’ and 
‘Warmwell’); a smaller water and gas company (‘Flowell UK’); and an electrical 
contracting company (‘Fixwell’).  Tables I-II contain more detailed information on 
the product-market environment, enterprise-specific factors and financial profiles for 
each of these companies.   
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[Take in Tables I-II] 
 
The research concentrated on a small number of case study firms which could be 
studied in depth over a period of years.  The aim of this approach was to gain an 
understanding of both management and union perceptions of partnership 
arrangements, and how those perceptions changed over time, from speaking directly 
to those involved in such arrangements.  Rather than look at just one or two 
organisations, it was felt necessary to construct a sample which could provide a varied 
cross section of ownership forms. Thus some firms have more concentrated patterns 
of shareholder ownership (Cleanwell, Flowell and Fixwell) while, for others, it is 
more dispersed (Hearwell, Warmwell, Seewell and Tenswell).  While the majority of 
the sample have a combination of US and UK shareholder ownership, Cleanwell and 
Flowell have continental European ownership.  In other respects, the companies are 
similar.  All seven are unionised companies; all have been actively engaged in merger 
and acquisition activity or in listing on or de-listing from the stock market in the 
period of the study; all have sought to promote partnership with employees and 
unions.  Six have global operations or are subsidiaries of global parent corporations.   
 
Companies in the sample were initially contacted in the late 1990s.  Interviews on the 
issue of partnership were carried out with senior managers in the spring and summer 
of 1998, and the companies were then re-interviewed during 2000 and 2001 to see 
how partnership relations had developed in the interim.  Interviews were also 
conducted with national-level trade union officials in relation to the specific 
companies and to conditions operating more generally in the sectors concerned.  
Detailed case histories of the companies were then undertaken, focusing on the one 
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hand on capital structure, dividend policy and financial earnings and, on the other, on 
human resource strategy.  Finally, the regulatory framework for their respective 
product market sectors was studied in detail.  The case histories and regulatory studies 
served to place the interview material in context, making it possible to locate the 
interviewees’ perceptions of partnership with reference to relevant enterprise-specific 
factors and the wider market environment, as we shall now describe.   
 
Concentrated versus dispersed ownership 
 
Cases of concentrated ownership 
 
We find evidence, firstly, that concentrated ownership may be perceived by 
management and unions alike to provide a strong foundation for partnership. In 
Fixwell’s case, the company’s five managing directors organised a management 
buyout in 1997 in order to allow the firm to more easily pursue its chosen business 
objectives in a difficult economic environment.  According to the personnel director, 
the absence of external shareholders permitted the company to ‘not get blown off 
course during difficult trading conditions’ and to maintain its commitment to high 
ethical standards and a high quality service. ‘We can grow at our own pace, we can 
make decisions that are sensible to us as a commercial organisation.  There’s no one 
else to please other than the five directors.’ 
 
In another case where partnership was described by the union as ‘mature and deep,’ 
the company (Cleanwell UK) was a wholly owned subsidiary of a continental 
European company (Cleanwell International).  In this case, prior to 2000, 
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approximately half of the voting shares were controlled by five main holdings, two of 
these being continental European public sector pension funds and one a continental 
European bank.  Cleanwell International shares are primarily listed on a continental 
European stock exchange, with a secondary listing on the London Stock Exchange. 
The trade union at Cleanwell UK felt that the continental European model of 
ownership was an ‘important influence’ on the company’s approach to human 
resource strategy and union relations.   
 
Still, it is important to stress that even under this model, the corporate group’s focus 
was on the creation of shareholder value; its stated business objective was to double 
turnover, operating profit and earnings per share by 2005.  The significance for 
partnership is that the group was able to commit to growing the business over the 
longer-term.  According to its 2000 annual report, Cleanwell International ‘believes 
that management, employees and shareholders share common long-term interests.’  In 
2000, Cleanwell International’s chief executive said, ‘we do not believe in 
“management by quarter”,1 with big dividends, fragmentation of the business with a 
view to short term profit’.  The company does not pay a dividend, preferring to fund 
further investment from retained profits.  According to Cleanwell UK’s finance 
director in 2001, the pressure felt from shareholders and bankers is to demonstrate 
‘credibility of management,’ by delivering what is promised. 
 
Moreover, there are signs in the case of Cleanwell that partnership relations can 
endure despite a move to a more dispersed shareholder base.  In 2000, Cleanwell 
International’s corporate governance environment changed significantly as Cleanwell 
increased its issued share capital by 5.1 per cent to fund acquisitions, and merged the 
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voting and capital shares into a single class.  As a result, its shareholder base became 
much more dispersed, with only one pension scheme holding more than 5 per cent of 
the share capital. The geographical distribution of shares also shifted: 30 per cent of 
investors were now continental European, while 56 per cent were from Britain and 
America. Despite this change in share ownership, there was still strong evidence of 
Cleanwell’s commitment to partnership with its employees.  In 2000, the Group 
launched a new human resource strategy as ‘a core element’ of the Group’s overall 
business strategy, and set up a corporate human resource function ‘to strengthen its 
employee development efforts.’  Although it may be too early to tell, according to the 
UK finance director, changing share ownership is not a negative factor for partnership 
because new investors know what they are buying into.  
 
Nor, conversely, does concentrated ownership appear to guarantee partnership.  In one 
company (Flowell UK), we found evidence that a single block shareholding by a 
continental European parent can even be destructive of partnership-style working 
practices.  In May 2000, Flowell UK became a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
continental European multi-utility company, Flowell International, which had 
previously held a substantial part of Flowell UK’s equity.  According to Flowell UK’s 
managing director, the continental European parent could be rated at seven or eight 
(out of ten) in terms of taking a long-term approach (compared with a rating of one 
for an American and two for a UK parent).  Nevertheless, he told us that pressure 
from a single shareholder (to return a satisfactory dividend) was felt all the more 
intensely than pressure from dispersed shareholders. By the time of the second wave 
of interviews, there was substantial evidence of the breakdown of partnership in 
employment relations at Flowell UK.  Following the takeover, work was increasingly 
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contracted out and we were told by a senior manager that there was a ‘culture of 
insecurity [that] runs right the way through the company, from the top to the bottom.’   
 
Cases of dispersed ownership 
 
Tenswell UK provides the strongest evidence of the claim that the pressure to deliver 
continuously high returns to a dispersed shareholder base can have a destructive 
impact on partnership with employees.  This company had a long history of labour-
management partnership both before and after privatization in the 1980s.  In 1998, 
however, Tenswell’s chairman said:  ‘[o]ur business is about profits and shareholder 
value.  If it’s jobs before shareholder interests, the answer is no…it simply prolongs 
the agony.’ In 1999, the company merged with a large continental European 
manufacturer to become Tenswell International.  Its ordinary shares were then traded 
on the London Stock Exchange and a continental European stock exchange; its 
American depository shares, each representing 10 ordinary shares, were listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange.   
 
In February 2001, the company announced a major restructuring programme and the 
loss of 6,000 jobs. There was no prior consultation with employee representatives, 
union proposals were rejected outright, and government ministers criticised Tenswell 
for its failure to consult with them.  On the day of the restructuring announcement, 
Tenswell’s share price increased by 11 per cent.  The trade union was particularly 
critical of American institutional investors. They were perceived to have a short-term, 
finance-centred view and to be distant from the political and social implications 
associated with plant closures in the UK. However, it is important to note here that 
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although American investors represented approximately 32 per cent of Tenswell 
shareholders and three US institutions owned 16 per cent of the shares, a similar 
proportion of Cleanwell International shareholders are also American.2  It is also 
significant that the union at Tenswell stressed the negative influence brought to bear 
by a German bank that owned 5 per cent of Tenswell International’s shares.  
According to the union, pressure on the company from the German bank to reduce 
borrowings was a significant factor in the company’s restructuring plans and its 
decision to eliminate 6,000 jobs.  
 
But although the example of Tenswell suggests that the UK system of corporate 
governance can indeed serve as a constraint on partnership, the cases of Warmwell 
and Hearwell demonstrate that mature and enduring partnership can also be developed 
and maintained within the UK’s distinctive corporate governance environment.  Both 
companies have been commended by the government for their partnership approach 
to employment relations.  According to the personnel director of Warmwell, ‘we have 
excellent relations with our trade unions. We sit at the table with them at the national 
and the local level. We ... recognise the value of a legitimate role for the trade unions. 
Why fight? Why go back to the seventies?  If there is a problem, we share the 
problem and the solution.’ At Hearwell, too, the union described a ‘mature’ 
partnership, explaining that evidence could be found in the fact that over a two-year 
period, the company and union had negotiated a complete overhaul of the system of 
grading structures, pay and conditions. In the opinion of the union official we 
interviewed, the result was a win-win situation: the company achieved greater 
flexibility and employees achieved better pay and a reduced working week.  
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Hearwell’s personnel director commented in 1999, ‘I hesitate to call it a partnership, 
although to some extent that’s what it has become.’  
 
Yet both companies have highly dispersed share ownership3 and in their annual 
reports stress the importance of delivering value to shareholders.  During the period of 
the study, both companies also pursued strategies designed to pay high dividends 
relative to earnings.4  In 2000 Warmwell announced an intention to grow its dividend 
by 5 per cent in nominal terms over the next three financial years.  Hearwell told us 
that executive bonuses depend on maintaining the company’s position in the top thirty 
UK companies, based on delivering total shareholder returns (that is, stock value 
growth plus dividend flow) over a five year period.  According to Hearwell’s director 
of strategy, shareholders are the company’s ‘most important’ stakeholder group.  
 
The key to both companies’ experience is the emphasis on delivering long-term 
shareholder value and on managing shareholder expectations.  According to 
Warmwell’s 1999 annual report, there is a ‘long-term strategy of concentrating 
on…shareholder value’ (emphasis added).  Warmwell’s personnel director told us that 
‘we spend a lot of time trying to educate the stock market on what we’re about…the 
institutions are seeing us in a better light…All of our strategies are about building 
businesses. We believe that you can’t do that in the short term…In every pound that 
we use to acquire or to grow organically, we’re looking for a long term return.’  It was 
his belief that such a strategy would support the provision of regular, above average 
returns to shareholders. The union at Seewell, a company with a less articulated form 
of partnership, stressed the importance of managing shareholder expectations: ‘it’s 
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what management promises to shareholders, not what shareholders demand of 
management.’ 
 
According to Hearwell’s 2000 annual report, the chief executive and group finance 
director hold meetings with the company’s principal institutional shareholders to 
discuss the company’s strategy, financial performance and specific major investment 
activities.  In 1999, Hearwell told us that ‘we have a different shareholder base to our 
competitors. We have a lot of pension funds and so on who are interested in long-
running, continuing cash flows rather than sparky value appreciation and decline … I 
think the other thing is that we are quite explicit that we are a medium term stock.’ 
(emphasis added).5   
 
During 2001, however, Hearwell came under pressure from the financial markets, as 
debts mounted following a series of acquisitions and certain investments failed to 
produce expected returns.  The response of Hearwell’s union was significant, in that it 
carefully avoided making the argument that the UK model of corporate governance 
had a negative effect on partnership.  It did, however, say that the need to satisfy the 
financial markets could distract management from developing more long-term 
strategies because as share prices fell, management was prone to making ‘knee jerk 
reactions’, attacking costs in order to demonstrate to financial analysts that some 
action was being taken.6  The union also said that it would refuse to join in public 
criticism of the company. Rather, it was urging management to be less defensive in 
managing financial analysts and more aggressive in publicising the company’s 
underlying achievements.   
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The cases also demonstrate the potential for a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between partnership in employment relations and those rules of the UK system of 
corporate governance that encourage a high level of takeover and merger activity.  
Warmwell and Cleanwell are instructive cases, since both are companies in which 
partnership has endured over time, at the same time as the companies have sought to 
grow shareholder value through a strategy of acquisition.  In the case of Warmwell, 
partnership has been employed as a mechanism to assist in the takeover process.  
According to Warmwell’s human resource director, the company’s acquisition of 
another UK utility was made possible by Warmwell’s human resource strategy: ‘[we] 
use our trade unions … to talk with the local unions and say “we know you don’t like 
the idea of being taken over.  We don’t like the idea of you being taken over.  But if 
you’re going to be taken over, it’s better that it’s these guys because they know what 
they’re going to do and they’ll treat you firmly but very fairly”’.  Takeovers of this 
kind can be used to import the partnership philosophy into companies that were 
previously hostile to the concept.   After Warmwell completed its acquisition, it 
reintroduced union recognition arrangements that the previous management had 
removed following privatisation.   
 
The experience of Cleanwell UK offers a further example.  In 2000, Cleanwell UK 
acquired a UK listed company, which was de-listed following the acquisition. 
According to the union,  
 
‘in the case of [X], the effect is overwhelmingly positive. We did not have any 
national relationship with [X] and our local relationships varied from the neutral 
to the very bad. So it has been a massive step forward just in terms of dialogue, 
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ability to raise issues…In general terms, we see acquisitions by [Cleanwell UK ] 
positively. They seem to extend their company philosophy into the companies 
they take over rather than importing other philosophies from the companies they 
take over.’ 
 
In short, there is a complex relationship between corporate governance models and 
the ability to sustain partnership.  There are suggestions that the corporate governance 
system may favour partnership, at least in the sense of enabling successful 
experiments in partnership to provide the springboard for companies to undertake 
acquisitions of less successful competitors.  This suggests that the market for 
corporate control, on its own, is not a decisive factor for or against partnership.  
However, we need to investigate more closely how corporate governance interacts 
with other factors that influence the sustainability of partnership, in particular market 
regulation, product market conditions and the dynamics of relations between 
management and unions at enterprise level. 
 
Regulation  
 
The nature of regulation has an important influence on the sustainability of 
partnership in employment relations through its impact on the hierarchy of 
stakeholder interests as well as its effect on conditions and requirements firms 
confront in their product markets.  According to the Seewell union, ‘regulation is the 
pervading influence … ownership is not a distinct driver.’ Similarly, the personnel 
director at Warmwell told us that the ability of the company to pursue a long-term 
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strategy, while at the same time delivering year-on-year above average returns ‘very 
much depends … where regulation goes.’    
 
Regulations can serve as a complement to corporate governance through their 
influence on the relative position of stakeholder groups within the hierarchy of 
interests they support.  From this perspective, the most supportive environment for 
partnership is one in which regulations buttress the relative position of employees.  
The regulation of the Private Finance Initative in the NHS provides a good example.  
With the objective of ensuring a high quality standard of service in this sector, PFI 
regulations in the NHS require evaluation of the employment-relations records of 
firms who bid for contracts;7 they also entitle trade unions to interview and submit a 
report on short-listed bidders.8 According to the guidelines, the underlying logic is 
that companies with poor labour relations and inadequate investment in staff often 
deliver a poor standard of service.  We found strong evidence of the supportive role of 
PFI regulation in the NHS in the case of Cleanwell UK, which has been particularly 
successful in this area.  In 2000 Cleanwell UK held ten contracts with an annual 
turnover of over £30 million.   
 
Equally, the imposition of guaranteed customer service standards by regulators in the 
utilities serves as a significant support mechanism for partnership because it means 
that pressures to cut costs cannot be permitted to undermine standards of customer 
service.9 According to the managing director of Flowell, ‘the whole thing is driven by 
customer service.’  This is important because regulators themselves intensify the 
pressure to cut costs and increase efficiency by imposing price controls. In the UK, 
regulation has tended to restrict price increases to customers to levels below the 
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increase in the retail price index, through a formula expressed as RPI – X (with ‘RPI’ 
indicating retail price inflation and ‘X’ an efficiency improvement brought about by 
enhanced performance).  In themselves, price controls potentially serve as a constraint 
on partnership because of the likelihood that they will lead to restructuring and 
downsizing. However, when taken together, price controls and customer service 
requirements may provide strong incentives for active partnership to be sought as a 
way of enhancing the level of performance. At both Seewell and Hearwell, the unions 
told us that high guaranteed standards of customer service provide an effective 
bargaining tool in negotiations over cost cutting: ‘[t]he vulnerable area is customer 
relationships and if those are disrupted, then there are various means through the 
regulator and other bodies by which [the company] will be brought to account. So 
that’s advantageous to us.’  
 
Telecommunications and utilities regulations can also extend time horizons by 
tempering the expectations of capital providers and extending operating parameters.  
By allowing for capital providers what one interviewee called ‘a return that is 
sufficient, but no more than sufficient,’ these regulations temper the expectations of 
institutional investors, facilitating a longer-term view that is conducive to partnership.  
Regulators make assessments for costs of debt, costs of equity and dividend yields in 
their price determinations.10  They also set operating parameters for periods of up to 
five years.   According to the water regulator, financing costs have fallen as ‘financial 
markets have adapted to the position of privatised utilities’.11  At the same time, 
regulators’ assessments of returns on capital are indicative and not prescriptive;12 
regulators determine the level of prices but leave it to companies to manage their level 
of profits. As a result, this form of regulation still provides only a very weak support 
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mechanism for partnership in itself; it is open to companies operating under this 
regime to decide whether or not to opt for a proactive approach to partnership.  
 
Nevertheless, the stress on quality of customer service in utility regulation can serve 
to encourage active partnership in conjunction with the operation of the takeover 
mechanism. Warmwell, which combined what both management and unions regarded 
as a particularly strong labour-management partnership with a highly proactive role in 
the market for corporate control, illustrates this point. Warmwell’s bid for another UK 
utility company was assisted by the publication by the regulator of information 
relating to levels of customer service and organisational costs in companies which had 
recently been privatised.  On this basis, Warmwell’s management was able to 
benchmark the company’s performance against industry standards and identify a 
suitable target for acquisition.  As one of its senior managers put it: 
 
‘The skills that we built through benchmarking were just the same ones that we 
needed to evaluate potential acquisitions… We looked at [the target] and said 
we know what it can do: its costs per customer, per kilometre of line, its fault 
rates and so on were all in the public domain from the regulatory process.  We 
knew the international benchmarking levels possible from looking at … other 
leading companies.  We could say - if that company was under our control, this 
is what it would be worth to us.  We then looked at what we would have to pay 
for it.’ 
 
The information generated by regulation was used by the company to exploit what it 
considered to be its comparative advantage in being better able than the target to meet 
 19
high standards of service.  In that sense, as in the case of PFI, the regulatory process 
can be said to have had a bias in favour of companies which rely on a partnership 
ethic to enhance their performance. 
 
Regulation also affects the nature of product market competition which in turn 
impacts on the firm’s ability to maintain partnership in employment relations.  In 
general, the more volatile a market, the greater the pressures operating on the firm and 
the more difficult it is to maintain the partnership, whereas sectors characterised by 
high technical barriers to entry and managed competition are conducive to 
partnership. Cleanwell UK’s differential experience in the PFI market in the NHS and 
the railway sector provides a good example.  According to the union at Cleanwell UK, 
in the NHS PFI market, ‘the big five, between them, control 85 per cent of the market. 
The small companies are all being edged out.’ The union pointed out that there are 
high barriers to entry associated with running a NHS building contract. ‘There are a 
lot of risks … so [NHS bodies] tend to go with people they know, which has helped 
[Cleanwell].’ Furthermore, ‘because of the nature of the contracts, you have to be 
pretty big.’ PFI contracts are typically awarded for 25-30 years and ‘it is very unlikely 
that the contract will be taken away from the PFI company that gets it in the first 
place.’ The union suggested that this meant that Cleanwell could look at the long- 
term profitability of PFI contracts and so ‘the degree of conflict in the first few years 
is lessened.’ By contrast, in the railway marketplace there were many medium and 
small sized companies competing for short-term contracts, primarily on the basis of 
price. The management of of Cleanwell UK regarded this as a constraint on the 
Cleanwell approach.  
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At Tenswell, by contrast, not only was share ownership highly dispersed (and held 
mainly by British or American investors) but there was also an absence of market and 
regulatory factors favouring partnership at the time of the major plant closure which 
occurred in 2000.  Over 80 per cent of the workforce was engaged in the production 
of a product whose markets were extremely volatile and price sensitive and for which 
there was substantial global over-supply.  Regulation had if anything been aimed at 
increasing the intensity of national competition through the removal of barriers to 
trade, and this globalised market was little affected by price and quality standards.  
 
 
The management of partnership 
 
In addition to the factors we have so far been considering, the quality and vision of 
company management at all levels of the organisation, from the strategic level on 
down, contributed significantly to the effectiveness of partnership in the companies 
we studied.  In the case of Warmwell, its human resource director told us, ‘human 
resource strategy is equally as important, not anymore so, not any less so, than the 
financial, commercial and engineering strategy.  It is by playing all the strands at the 
same time that we get the key strength’.  The union at Hearwell also stressed the 
importance of the role of management as ‘an interface’ between the investment 
community, the regulator, customers and workers.  This was particularly evident 
during the massive restructuring following privatization, during which Hearwell’s 
chief executive was perceived to act as a buffer between the union and the board to 
ensure that there were no compulsory redundancies. The role of a ‘hard hitting’ 
human resource director who could persuade the board of the case for investment in 
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human capital and deliver on commitments was also seen as integral to effective 
partnership relations at Hearwell.  According to the union, partnership is ‘not just a 
piece of paper that sets out procedures. It is about identifying issues, trustworthy 
behaviour, and delivering high quality outputs.’  
 
The strength and sophistication of the union is also vitally important for the success of 
partnership.  A weak and/or adversarial union (at the national and/or local level) can 
be an impediment to partnership.  At Flowell, despite an improvement in union 
density from 40 per cent in 1998 to 50 per cent in 2001 (resulting from the successful 
recruitment campaign of a large union), the local union was regarded by management 
as weak and ineffective.  Collective bargaining rights were granted in 1999 only under 
the pressure of legislation putting in place a statutory procedure aimed at encouraging 
recognition.13  By contrast, at Hearwell, where the position of the union had been 
strengthened following the company’s unilateral decision, in 1996, to restore trade 
union recognition at a subsidiary it had acquired by takeover, the personnel director 
could comment: 
 
‘The unions themselves have become more and more realistic in terms of what 
it means to be a private [sector] company in terms of what their role is, how 
they can participate in a strategic debate…they have been well served over that 
period by the national leadership.’ 
 
A strategic approach to partnership has also been adopted by the union at Cleanwell 
UK, which, while fundamentally opposed to PFI and contracting out in the public 
sector, has used regulation of the PFI process to strengthen its bargaining position:  
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 ‘We don’t actually agree with the fact that [Cleanwell] should have the contract 
in the first place …  [However] we have to deal with the world as it is rather 
than as we would like it to be. So, if private sector employers are going to be 
awarded contracts … we have taken the view that it is better that we have a 
partnership arrangement with those employers, rather than a wholly conflictual 
one.’ 
 
It is at the operational level that the true effectiveness of partnership is particularly 
manifest.  According to the union at Seewell, the attitude of management was that 
‘this is our agenda, these are our decisions, we make them, we implement them. It’s 
not actually we don’t want to deal with unions, it’s just that we own the problem and 
we’re going to drive it.’  By contrast, the personnel director at Warmwell (Seewell’s 
competitor) told us that ‘trade unions in many ways assist me in solving my problems. 
They solve problems for me before they even come to my attention.’  Fixwell’s 
personnel director echoed this view: 
 
‘They help us to manage change, you know a lot of the change that we have 
needed to introduce within the business would not have been managed without 
the involvement of the trade unions. They do a lot of work in communicating to 
staff and they provide a good check and balance as well…Commercial pressures 
on the business will always pressure us into doing things…a bit of check and 
balance which the trade union provides helps us to see that perhaps we’re not 
being as reasonable as we could be. So, they do a good job for us.’ 
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The personnel director at Hearwell also highlighted the important role of the union as 
‘a very effective communication channel and a persuasion channel.’ 
 
There are, then, important differences in the conception of partnership that emerges 
from the dynamics of enterprise-level relations between unions and management (see 
Table II).  In most of the cases we studied, ‘partnership’ was defined as ‘working 
together to achieve a common objective’.  However, variation in that objective had an 
important influence on the type of partnership that developed.  In cases where the 
objective was to deliver a high quality or higher value product or service to 
consumers, or jointly to find a way forward in the face of market or regulatory 
opportunities and challenges, the partnership could be characterized as proactive and 
mature.  By this we mean that, having endured moments of difficulty for the company 
in the past, it was regarded as more likely to continue in the future.  In contrast, where 
the objective was to simply to involve the union to manage the execution of 
redundancies or plant closure, we may characterize the partnership as reactive and 
unstable.  From the case-study evidence presented here, such partnerships are unlikely 
to survive downsizing aimed at maintaining shareholder value over the immediate 
term.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Three principal findings emerge from our case studies into the impact of corporate 
governance on labour-management partnerships.  Firstly, ownership structures are 
important but not necessarily decisive in determining the emergence of partnership.  
Some companies with dispersed ownership demonstrate long-lasting partnership 
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arrangements, while others, with concentrated ownership, are characterized by its 
absence.   
 
Secondly, regulation of product and service quality, of the kind observed in most utility 
sectors and in certain others, favours the emergence of what we have called here 
‘mature’, that is to say, stable and enduring partnerships.  This is because, in these 
markets, profitability is linked to the ability of companies to maintain a high and 
consistent quality of service for end users over an extended period of time.  As a result, 
managers are better able to convince shareholders to take the view that they will reap 
significant returns over the long term from a stakeholder approach.  In the absence of 
these stabilizing factors, however, goodwill between labour and management is not 
enough to sustain a partnership approach when it conflicts with short term shareholder 
interests.  Then, the pressure to meet shareholder value over the immediate term tends to 
prevail.   
 
Thirdly, the role of the board in mapping out a strategic approach to corporate 
governance issues is essential.  In particular, executive directors can play an important 
role in arguing for a stakeholder-orientated strategy on the grounds that it will bring 
benefits over the longer-term, and, above all, in defending it when times are difficult.  
Since this long-term strategic positioning is quintessentially a function for the board, the 
incorporation of the human resource function into board-level corporate planning would 
appear to be a vital factor in underpinning partnership. 
 
It would therefore seem that corporate managers can feasibly aim to reconcile the 
interests of stakeholder groups with the goal of ‘enlightened shareholder value’.  This is 
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particularly the case where regulatory influences and the product market environment 
favour such an approach.   At the same time, our study suggests that regulatory and 
product market factors should not be viewed in isolation from corporate governance, 
broadly understood to include the structure of ownership and control and the conditions 
for the exercise of stakeholder voice.  There is a complex relationship between 
managerial strategy and investor expectations which requires further investigation.  
There are signs that institutional investors may be increasingly prepared to take a long-
term view of their holdings, just as managers may be prepared to make a case for 
corporate strategy to be judged against a long-term time horizon.  Our case studies also 
suggest that a proactive management benefits from strong and independent employee 
representation in building partnership.  However, employee representation of this kind is 
not consistently available.  Under these circumstances, it remains to be seen how durable 
labour-management partnerships will prove to be in response to exogenous shocks in the 
form of economic downturns and changes in systems of regulation. 
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Table I:  Case Study Characteristics:  The Structure of Ownership, Product Markets and the Regulatory Environment 
 
 Cleanwell Fixwell Flowell Hearwell Warmwell Seewell Tenswell 
 
Sector 
 
Specialised contract 
cleaning & facilities 
maintenance 
 
Electrical Contracting 
 
Multi-utility:      water 
& gas 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Multi-utility: 
electricity, gas, water 
 
Multi-utility: 
electricity & gas 
 
Manufacturer:   heavy 
industry 
 
Ownership 
(degree of 
dispersion, 
stock exchange 
listings) 
 
Concentrated: 
European parent     
 
Stock Exchanges: 
continental Europe 
 
 
Concentrated:    UK 
Management Buyout 
 
Not listed 
 
Concentrated: 
European parent 
 
Stock Exchanges: 
continental Europe 
 
 
Dispersed:         UK 
parent   
 
Stock Exchanges: 
London & NY 
 
Dispersed:         UK 
parent 
 
Stock Exchanges: 
London & NY 
 
Dispersed:          US 
parent 
 
Stock Exchanges: NY 
 
 
Dispersed:   Merger 
between UK & Euro 
parent 
 
Stock Exchanges:  
London, NY & 
continental Europe 
 
Regulation  
(stakeholder 
representation, 
industry 
regulations) 
 
Employee interests 
influence PFI 
 
Regulations:  quality 
in NHS, health & 
safety 
 
 
 
 
Regulations: 
predominantly health 
& safety 
 
Customer interests  
dominate 
 
Regulations:  price, 
quality service, 
financing,  
competition, 
environment 
 
Customer interests  
dominate 
 
Regulations:  price, 
quality service, 
financing, 
competition, 
environment 
 
 
Customer interests  
dominate 
 
Regulations:  price, 
quality service, 
financing, 
competition, 
environment  
 
Customer interests  
dominate 
 
Regulations:  price, 
quality service, 
financing, 
competition, 
environment 
 
 
 
 
Regulations minimal: 
environment,   health 
& safety 
 
Product 
Markets 
(product type, 
degree & 
nature of 
competition, 
supply 
relations) 
 
 
General cleaning:  
price competitive 
 
Specialised services: 
competition on the 
basis of quality and 
given price. Fewer, 
larger competitors; 
reputation important; 
long-term contracts in 
PFI 
 
Electrical contracting 
services  
 
Operates across 
different markets.  
 
Mainly high quality  
 
Mainly medium size 
contracts.  
Multi-utility services 
 
Generally very 
limited competition, 
although energy retail 
market open to 
competition 
 
Services & products: 
specialised & 
technologically 
sophisticated  
 
Competitive market: 
price & quality  
 
Long-term relations 
 
Multi-utility services 
 
Generally very 
limited competition, 
although energy retail 
market open to 
competition  
 
Multi-utility services 
 
Generally very 
limited competition, 
although energy retail 
market open to 
competition 
 
Mass produced, 
manufactured goods 
 
Intense competition 
on basis of price and 
satisfactory quality 
 
Volatile & difficult 
market conditions 
 
Short-term relations 
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Table II:  Case Study Characteristics:  Enterprise-specific Factors and Nature of Partnership 
 
 Cleanwell Fixwell Flowell Hearwell Warmwell Seewell Tenswell 
 
Enterprise 
Structure 
 
Multi-site 
Multi-country  
 
Multi-site 
UK 
 
Multi-plant 
Multi-country 
 
Multi-plant 
Multi-country 
 
Multi-plant 
UK & US 
 
Multi-plant 
Multi-country 
 
Multi-plant 
Multi-country  
 
Union 
Strength 
(density, 
effective 
representation) 
 
Density: 35% overall, 
60% in NHS sector 
 
Effective 
representation of 
membership 
 
Density: 50% 
 
New leadership at 
local level said to be 
less partnership 
orientated 
 
Density: 50% (up 
from 40% two years 
ago) 
 
Weak representation 
at local level 
 
Density: 60% 
Overall, 99% in 
networks  
 
Effective 
representation of 
membership 
 
Density: 45% overall, 
66% of staff covered 
by collective 
agreements 
 
Effective 
representation of 
membership 
 
Density: over 80% in 
generating and 
networks, less than 
10% in trading  
 
Internal divisions 
among Seewell 
unions 
 
Density:            80% 
overall, 100% blue 
collar 
 
Internal divisions 
 
Redundancies eroding 
UK membership base 
 
Nature of 
partnership 
 
Proactive and mature 
 
Voluntary 
 
Particularly mature 
and deep in NHS 
sector 
 
Joint consultation & 
dialogue 
 
HR policy supports 
business objectives & 
partnership  
 
Union involvement in 
working through 
challenges 
 
Recognition of 
mutual interests 
 
Proactive and mature 
 
Unions seen by 
management as an 
effective check and 
balance against 
commercial 
pressures. 
 
HR policy supports 
business objectives & 
partnership 
 
Very little; 
disintegrating 
 
Union only 
recognised as a result 
of legislation 
 
Works council with 
union and 
independent 
representatives 
 
Culture of insecurity 
 
Proactive (with some 
reactive elements) 
and mature 
 
Voluntary 
 
Mature, especially in 
traditional lines 
 
Joint consultation & 
dialogue 
 
HR policy supports 
business objectives & 
partnership  
 
Union involvement in 
working through 
challenges 
 
Recognition of 
mutual interests 
 
Proactive (with some 
reactive elements) 
and mature 
 
Divisional and local 
joint bodies to 
develop awareness of 
business plan and 
objectives. 
 
HR policy supports 
business objectives & 
partnership  
 
Union involvement in 
working through 
challenges 
 
Recognition of 
mutual interests 
 
Reactive and weak 
 
Much information & 
consultation in some 
parts of business but 
individualisation in 
other parts. 
 
Union not involved at 
all in strategy 
 
Union used to 
manage downsizing 
 
Issues owned by 
management 
 
Very little; 
disintegrating 
 
Insufficient sharing of 
information & 
consultation, 
especially re. 
redundancies & plant 
closures 
 
Union has no 
confidence in 
business strategy. 
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1 This is a reference to the common practice of quarterly assessments of the performance of fund 
managers (see Slinger and Deakin, 2000). 
2 1997: 35 per cent; 1998: 23 per cent; 1999: 23 per cent 2000: 30 per cent. Two US institutions 
held 15 per cent of the capital shares (8 per cent of voting shares) in December 1998. 
3  At March 2000, there were 531,000 holdings of Warmwell shares, 79 per cent of them UK 
based and 21 per cent US based. At March 2000 82 per cent of Hearwell’s shares were held in 
60,402 institutional holdings and 18 per cent in 1,751,341 individual holdings. 
4 In the 2000 financial year Warmwell’s underlying earnings per share fell by 2.6 per cent (for all 
UK businesses earnings per share increased by 1.4 per cent), but dividend per share increased by 
10.2 per cent. Dividend per share increased by an average 12.7 per cent per annum over the five 
years to 2000. At Hearwell dividend per share increased by 7.4 per cent in the 2000 financial year 
whereas underlying earnings per share fell by 2.2 per cent. 
5 This is supported by the comment of one of Hearwell’s leading shareholders, with a stake of 
more than 2 per cent, that ‘we’re certainly not bearish on telecoms when you take a medium-term 
view’ (Financial Times 3 May 2001). 
6 The union at Hearwell also argued that to have true partnership in terms of long term investment 
in human capital, it was crucially important to show training costs as an  investment in the 
balance sheet, to avoid this being the first thing that was cut when budgets were tightened. 
7 PFI in the NHS (1999) section 2, paragraph 5.79. See also PFI Projects: Disclosure of 
Information and Consultation with Staff and Other Interested Parties (1999), paragraph 4.3. 
8 Letter from the Secretary of State for Health to the Head of Health, UNISON, 20 October 1998. 
Generic guidelines of PFI state that, having regard to the views of tenderers, public sector clients 
should consider inviting recognised trade unions or staff representatives to discuss relevant 
employment issues with short listed bidders. PFI Projects: Disclosure of Information and 
Consultation with Staff and Other Interested Parties (1999), paragraph 4.3. 
9 See for example OFGEM Guaranteed and Overall Standards of Performance (1999). 
10 For example, in relation to the electricity distribution sector during the period of the study, the 
electricity regulatory body OFGEM estimated the cost of capital as a weighted average of the cost 
of debt and equity finance at 6.5 per cent, implying a dividend yield of 4.75 per cent. OFGEM 
Distribution Price Control Review (1999), pp. 38-47. 
11 OFWAT Periodic Review 1999, p.21 
12 OFGEM recognises that the figures it uses ‘may differ substantially’ from the actual levels paid 
out by the electricity companies: Distribution Price Control Review (1999), at p. 41. 
13  The relevant legislation was contained in the Employment Relations Act 1999; see generally 
Brown et al., 2001, on the meaning and impact of this legislation. 
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